Tag Archives: Active Directory

The Eternal Battle over Active Directory between OT and IT

29 October 2020

On October 13th I moderated the anapur Virtual Dialog “Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection”. During the breaks, some participants from industry talked about a really concerning issue: IT, IT-Security and GRC groups in their companies urge them to integrate their so far isolated production active directories in the corporate directory.

I have been involved in these discussion for 10 years and I never changed my answer:

Don’t do it!

This integration is dangerous. Active Directory simplifies lateral movement once an attacker created a foothold in your network. And it simplifies the distribution of malware through login scripts. Remind the Norsk Hydro attack from March 2019: Divisions with high vertical integration were more affected from LockerGoga than the Alumina production.

In their paper “Seven Strategies to Defend ICSs” from December 2016, DHS ICS-CERT, FBI and NSA provide a very clear active directory strategy:

Never share Active Directory, RSA ACE servers, or other trust stores between corporate and control networks.

For details see chapter 5, “Manage Authentication”.

Hope this helps in discussions with IT, IT-Security and GRC.


In his poem Ulysses, Alfred Tennyson brings it to the point:

Tho‘ much is taken, much abides;
and though we are not now that strength
which in old days moved earth and heaven;
that which we are, we are;
one equal temper of heroic hearts,
made weak by time and fate,
but strong in will to strive, to seek, to find.
And not to yield.

The technology dimension of social engineering

7 February 2015

In his post ‘Weird Security Term of the Week: “Social Engineering”’ Kurt Ellzey talks of ‘Social Engineering’ as the ‘Art of Getting Information’ about a person.

A short query on Google reveals a multitude of information that could be used to create a rough profile of a person. A malicious insider could easily enhance this profile by personal information gathered from e.g. a company intranet or SharePoint MySites.

Besides this ‘personal information’ a rich set of easy to extract ‘technical information’ about an employee is available from a company network.

A Windows workstation is a universal machine. It can be used to run an application as well as to administer a server or network. For example, the built-in ‘net’ command could be used to retrieve detailed employee account data from the Active Directory.

Some colors to fight the winter depression.

Some colors to fight the winter depression.
50°53’28.3″N 4°21’31.9″E

IAM (Identity and Access Management) systems, very often deployed as self-services to improve user satisfaction, could be used to get detailed information about the applications used by employees to get their job done.

But the worst is that this information sources are available for all employees, irrespective of whether they are needed in the job. This is a massive violation of the Principle of Least Privilege.

Attackers can read in company networks like in an open book.

And, when enriched with technical information, a personal profile becomes an invaluable information source for targeted attacks.

Just some suggestions on how to tackle these problems.

As general design principle I would strongly recommend to enforce the principle of least privilege for all information systems. Software restriction policies could be used to reject standard user access to administrative commands. IAM systems should offer only user related information on a user’s request.

I dream of an operating system which provides only those commands and applications which are essential for a user’s job. This could reduce the attack surface of a company dramatically.

Have a nice weekend!