Unsecured IIoT devices in untrusted networks

28 January 2017

I am currently reviewing a draft of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) about Operational and Control Technology. The goal of the paper is to define suitable requirements for IT security in OT.

IIoT devices, e.g. moderns sensors like the Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION7650 power meter, offer many communication options, including an optional Ethernet port:

PowerLogic ION 7650 communication options

Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION7650 communication options

With the Ethernet port activated the power meter behaves like a standard web server which provides standard internet communication options for access, e.g. ftp via port 21, http via ports 80, 81 and 443.

The BSI paper introduces the concept of ‘required connections‘ to communication partners outside the production network. This concept is based on the idea that production networks are isolated from a company’s office network as well as from the internet through security devices. The number of required connections, e.g. a connection from the ERP system to the Manufacturing Executions system (MES), should be kept as low as possible. In addition, required connections and the related communication endpoints must be specially protected to prevent misuse.

Lots of the PowerLogic ION7650 power meters are not operated in a production network. They are directly attached to the internet through an internet router, thus directly attackable by all internet users.

With this, each power meter creates its own production network, and every connection becomes a required connection. The major difference to the classic production network is that the power meter is far short of the protection capabilities a classic production network provides.

Thus, special attention has to be paid to the secure configuration of the devices and the attached internet routers during commissioning. Unfortunately, neither the service personnel setting up the device nor the operators seem to be aware of the dangers which result from this limited protection options because lots of unsecured devices are directly attached to the internet.

It is not very likely that a single compromised power meter has an impact on the national power grid. But if an attacker is able to compromise hundreds or thousands of devices …

The BSI paper provides a comprehensive set of technical and organizational measures to OT organizations to deal effectively with IT security issues in production environments.

Nevertheless, I recommend to the operators to review the configuration of and secure their devices. Besides financial loss due to malfunctions unsecured devices can be hijacked and included into bot nets.

Have a good weekend.

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