7 February 2015
In his post ‘Weird Security Term of the Week: “Social Engineering”’ Kurt Ellzey talks of ‘Social Engineering’ as the ‘Art of Getting Information’ about a person.
A short query on Google reveals a multitude of information that could be used to create a rough profile of a person. A malicious insider could easily enhance this profile by personal information gathered from e.g. a company intranet or SharePoint MySites.
Besides this ‘personal information’ a rich set of easy to extract ‘technical information’ about an employee is available from a company network.
A Windows workstation is a universal machine. It can be used to run an application as well as to administer a server or network. For example, the built-in ‘net’ command could be used to retrieve detailed employee account data from the Active Directory.
IAM (Identity and Access Management) systems, very often deployed as self-services to improve user satisfaction, could be used to get detailed information about the applications used by employees to get their job done.
But the worst is that this information sources are available for all employees, irrespective of whether they are needed in the job. This is a massive violation of the Principle of Least Privilege.
Attackers can read in company networks like in an open book.
And, when enriched with technical information, a personal profile becomes an invaluable information source for targeted attacks.
Just some suggestions on how to tackle these problems.
As general design principle I would strongly recommend to enforce the principle of least privilege for all information systems. Software restriction policies could be used to reject standard user access to administrative commands. IAM systems should offer only user related information on a user’s request.
I dream of an operating system which provides only those commands and applications which are essential for a user’s job. This could reduce the attack surface of a company dramatically.
Have a nice weekend!