In his latest post at ComputerWeekly.com Warwick Ashford reviews the CyberArk Report ‘Exploits of Privileged Accounts Shift the Front Lines of Security’. His post is absolutely worth reading.‘
‘“One of the reasons for this is smaller, less well-defended organisations have become a prime target for attackers who are ultimately aiming at larger partners in the supply chain,” said Mokady.’
That’s definitely true. Perhaps you remember the Home Depot data breach? This breach was caused by stolen credentials of a third-party vendor.
‘“Securing privileged accounts represents the new first line of defence in the ongoing cyber battle companies are fighting,” he added.’
Very well said. But what really confuses me is that Udi Mokady talks about the new first line of defense.
The majority of the big data breaches have been caused by stolen credentials. With a Two Factor Authentication (TFA) most of this breaches could have been prevented.
It’s definitely very important to secure privileged accounts. With admin privileges it is very easy to change log settings or tamper audit records. But it is definitely not enough to secure only privileged accounts. Because even with standard user privileges you may have access to business critical data to do your job.
Let me give you an example. Oracle Transparent Data Encryption and SQL*Net encryption and integrity checking are easy to implement measures to secure an Oracle database. This will prevent man-in-middle attacks, eavesdropping of the data traffic and direct access to the database files.
Sounds pretty secure, doesn’t it? Unfortunately it isn’t. Even an unprivileged user, and even more a malicious insider with stolen credentials, is able to install an oracle instant client and use Excel and ODBC to create a copy of all data he could use with his standard user rights.
With TFA enabled, at least on all business critical systems, and for all users, the probability of such an event is dramatically reduced.
Securing accounts with TFA is the very first line of defense.
In addition you should decide about granting privileged access on a per task basis. For business critical infrastructure and applications an administrator should receive an authorization and one-time-password for just one task. At log off the authorizations are dropped. In the best case the admin group for a windows servers is empty. Only the local admin could always logon, but his password is in a safe place.
The authorization process should be implemented with strict application of the separation-of-duties principle, and the permissions should be granted with strict Application of the principle of least privilege. Important: The employees who grant authorizations and privileges should never have the possibility to grant whatever privileges to themselves.
Moreover the consistent application of the principle of least privileges even for standard users and processes will significantly reduce the attack surface of your company.
Nothing really new, just the same old story.
Have a good Weekend.